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4 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the analysis was to determine the performance of CBA in Estonia.  First of all, we 
were interested in transmission channels working in the Estonian economy. The second aim 
of the analysis was more ambitious - to establish whether and in which way the post-shock 
adjustment works for studying  the sustainability of CBA in Estonia.  
The effect of shocks was studied with the help of model simulations. The shocking 
included endogenous as well as exogenous variables. The size of a shock was equalled to one 
standard deviation/or one (etc) percentage point. The temporary shock lasted from one quarter 
to one year depending on the nature of the variable under consideration. The permanent shock 
persisted up to the end of the simulation period. The impact of the shock was established as 
deviation from the baseline, which has been produced as an average of dynamic stochastic ex-
post simulation. 
The model used for simulations was the “reduced”1 (and commonly the Keynesian)  type 
macromodel, which has been estimated statistically.  As it is well known, this class of models 
has a drawback as shown in the Lucas’ critique. In spite of that we had to make the best of it 
since presently there are no analyses of Estonian economy that could be used in construction 
and calibration of the dynamic general equilibrium model. 
Due to the fact that shocking took place in 1998, the outcome and conclusion from 
shocking are strongly backward oriented. To gain the results which were valid without  
doubts also for the future, the relevance of forward looking expectations2 should be increased 
in the model (or DGEM should be used).  
As the diagnostic simulations have shown the Estonian economy under the CBA adjusts 
relatively rapidly back to the long-run trajectory after shocks. The model includes nominal 
rigidities (staggered price contracts, partly backward looking price formation, ECM etc) in the 
short run which allow monetary shocks to have real effects. So the model can be characterized 
as having a Keynesian short-run with the neoclassical long-run. 
The background for the study is the research done in the field of currency board shock 
sensitivity: Kwan-Lui (1999), Frenkel-Nickel-Schmidt (1999), Baltic (2000), Dobrinsky 
(2000), Avramov (1999) which provide the study with both stylised facts and analysis 
methodology. 
 
                                                 
1  According to the claims of supporters of reduced type models, the macroequations are derived from 
theoretical microfoundations. Though, as a rule, microfoundations are presented not in general equilibrium, 
but in partial structure.  
2  In the current version of the model the forward looking behavior is explicitly modeled in the price formation 
which is based on Calvo’s staggered contracts approach.  
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1. CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT IN ESTONIA  
The currency reform started in June 20, 1992 in Estonia and was backed up by basic 
legislation which determined the nature of the reform (The Currency Act, Foreign Currency 
Act, Act of the Republic of Estonia on the Security of the Estonian Kroon (adopted in the 
Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia in May 20, 1992). With the reform the currency 
board (CBA) system was introduced.  
CBA is a monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange 
domestic currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate combined with 
restrictions on the issuing authority - the CBA - to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation 
(IMF (1996)).  
CBA is restricted by a legal barrier to change the exchange rate. That the exchange rate can 
be changed only with great difficulties adds to the CBA’s credibility. The backing rule 
eliminates (or strictly limits) the scope for issuing unbacked monetary liabilities ensuring that 
the CBA does not run out of foreign reserves to maintain the parity (IMF (1996)). 
The main characteristic of the CBA system is that the board stands ready to exchange 
domestic currency for the foreign reserve currency at a specified and fixed rate (Walters -
Hanke (1992)).  In case of a CBA the money supply is endogenous consisting in exchanging 
domestic currency at a fixed exchange rate to the currency that forms the reserve. 
The CBA bears a certain resemblance (though in a completely modified context) with gold 
standard principles. It could be considered as a 'surrogate' for the automatism and the rules of 
the gold standard. In some sense it is a return to the goals' hierarchy of the gold standard and 
to the corresponding adjustment mechanisms. Both systems aim to subordinate money supply 
to simple, effective and transparent rules. They affect macroeconomic policy by imposing the 
strongest discipline - that of capital movements and the markets. (Avramov (1999)) 
The principal features of the Estonian CBA are 100% backing of base money, fixed 
exchange rate regime and complete convertibility of kroon. 
Under the terms of the Act on the Security of the Estonian Kroon, the currency issue is 
fully backed by the gold and convertible foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Estonia. 
The Bank may change the amount of Estonian kroons in circulation only in accordance with 
changes in its gold and foreign exchange reserves (Clauses 1 and 4 of the above Act). 
CBAs are principally required to hold realizable financial assets in the reserve currency at 
least equal to the value of domestic currency outstanding (Walters - Hanke (1992)). Actually 
the claims against the CBA and backed by reserves can be broader or narrower. For instance, 
Argentina has adopted a quasi-CBA arrangement in which only newly issued domestic 
currency, but not the whole outstanding stock, is 100 percent backed by foreign reserves with 
all currency convertible at a fixed exchange rate. (Osband-Villaneuva (1992)) 
According to rules of the Estonian CBA, the deposits of commercial banks (required and 
excess reserves) with Eesti Pank are backed in the same way as cash. This solution was 
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conditioned by practical considerations. In Estonia there was no effective system of interbank 
clearing outside the central bank. Therefore the banks had to keep their accounts in Eesti 
Pank. In the moment of kroon‘s issue it was crucial to create and support confidence in newly 
issued currency as well as in the monetary system as a whole. For this purpose, the 
obligations of the central bank to the commercial banks were decided to be backed. 
A broader than usual CBA backing became possible due to the sufficient reserves. Gold 
reserves became available to the Estonian central bank following the agreement to repatriate 
gold deposited by Estonia with the Bank of England before the occupation of the country in 
1940 (Saavalainen (1995)). So at the moment of the currency reform in June 1992, 90% of 
obligations of the CB was backed with reserves. The rest of the initial reserves was formed 
subsequent restitution by Swedish government and the Bank for International Settlements. By 
mid-July, the CB had already excess reserves compared to the obligations.  
Since 20th June 1992, the exchange rate regime has been a fixed rate against the Deutsche 
mark of 8 EEK = 1 DEM. From the beginning of 1999, the Estonian kroon is also fixed to 
euro (15,6466 EEK = 1EUR) 
According to the legislation, the Bank of Estonia has no power to devalue the Estonian 
kroon. Any change in the exchange rate of the kroon leading to a devaluation against the 
Deutsche mark must first be approved by the Parliament. 
Considering the convertibility, there are no restrictions on current account transactions of 
balance of payments. With effect from 15th August 1994, Estonia has accepted the 
obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement, under which members 
undertake to refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for 
current international transactions or from engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements 
or multiple-currency practices without IMF approval.  
The only valid restriction for capital account transactions is connected with the purchase of 
land by non-residents (the permission of the Government or local authority is needed). There 
are no further restrictions on capital account transactions. 
Although the Bank of Estonia cannot conduct a discretionary monetary policy, it has 
implemented several measures aimed at improving the monetary policy operational 
framework to enhance the sustainability of the financial system. 
ICEG EC Working Paper Urmas Sepp - Martti Randveer: The Sustainability… 
 
 
7 
2.  FEATURES OF CBA  
2.1. Credibility 
CBA provides credidibility while even the possibility of discretionary policy may raise 
inflationary expectations.3 CBA is an extreme/special form of fixed/pegged exchange rate 
systems whereby irreversibility of commitment is guaranteed by a legally fixed parity 
between the national currency and the reserve currency. Thus the currency board is capable of 
enhancing confidence, reducing the risk of attack against the national currency and imposing 
the stricter discipline rules of fixed exchange rate regimes. (Avramov (1999)) 
By eliminating or strictly limiting the monetary authorities' ability to monetize fiscal 
deficits, or lend to banks, CBA can rapidly strengthen credibility. In principle, CBAs would 
be expected to be more effective than conventional fixed pegs when the monetary authorities' 
reputation has been weakened by a history of lax fiscal policy, accommodative monetary 
policy, and failed stabilization attempts or when the authorities lack an established track 
record (as in Estonia and Lithuania). By providing clear signals about the policy intentions of 
the authorities, and ensuring monetary independence from the government, CBAs facilitate an 
adjustment of expectations and promote wage and price discipline, thereby lessening potential 
inflation biases. (IMF (1996)) 
Under fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, a country can not pursue an 
independent monetary policy. In the case of  CBA there are legal restrictions on the use of  
policy tools. (IMF (1996)) Under the currency board, the central bank would lose its 
discretion to act, and inflation and real interest rates would drop toward the levels of those in 
the country issuing the anchor currency. The more credible policy environment would provide 
a better framework for stability and growth. (Gulde (1999)) 
2.2. Adjustment Process 
In accordance with the CBA principle, liquidity management of the banking system is the 
responsibility of the commercial banks themselves, i.e. of the market. Due to the lack of 
instruments (or their inefficiency), the CBA is characterized by the nondiscretionary monetary 
policy and nonintervention. Endogenous money supply is directly linked to automatic 
“sterilization” of the excess liquidity. Sterilization of excess liquidity is engineered through 
the increase of foreign assets of the commercial banks. In other words, banks tend to increase 
their foreign assets if there is no demand (acceptable by banks) for their domestic assets. The 
opposite process is also possible, meaning that banks increase their domestic assets by 
                                                 
3  CBA is but one of the elements of the stabilization program. Although it will, if properly designed, contribute 
to eliminating macroeconomic imbalances, its long-term survival depends equally on the implementations of 
appropriate supporting measures (Gulde (1999)) 
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decreasing their foreign assets. 4 The above-mentioned sterilisation brings money supply into 
accordance with demand and eliminates excessive money supply in the long run.   
The adjustment mechanism works through interest rate arbitrage. Under the specie flow 
process, an outflow of capital, as a result of doubts about the exchange rate, would lead to a 
contraction of the money supply. The interest rates then go up, and a counter-flow of funds is 
induced. The series of event would take place automatically and speedily, so that the 
exchange rate can be “fixed” without government intervention.5 (Tsang (1998)) 
According to Tsang such logic seems a bit shaky. Under normal circumstances, interest rate 
hikes may contribute towards the stabilization of a currency. But if the exchange rate is itself 
fluctuating and looks insecure, higher interest rates will not necessarily induce a counterflow 
of capital. In this sense, the specie flow process is not a reliable mechanism in fixing an 
exchange rate. Therefore, there is the need for the second mechanism of the CBA: currency 
arbitrage (alternatively known as exchange rate arbitrage) that directly binds the exchange 
rate. Given the board’s 100% foreign reserves for cash in circulation, cash arbitrage can be 
carried out. In case the market exchange rate weakens from the official rate, people can 
convert their bank deposits into cash, go to the currency board to exchange the cash into 
foreign currency at the stronger official rate, and then sell the foreign currency in the market. 
This arbitrage activity will yield a riskless profit, and the selling pressure on the foreign 
currency will bring the market exchange rate back to the official level. (Tsang (1998)) 
3. THE RATIONALE FOR THE CHOICE OF THE CBA   
Estonia’s choice of the CBA reflected the search for high credibility and transparency of 
monetary policy as well as a firm ground for economic reforms.  
3.1. Institutional Underdevelopment 
An important reason for choosing CBA in 1992 was due to limited central banking expertise. 
Although the Bank of Estonia was re-established in 1989, it did not have any control over 
monetary policy until the monetary reform in 1992. Due to the lack of any expertise in 
implementing independent monetary policy CBA was partially chosen for its simplicity. In 
                                                 
4  The referred process is the main mitigating remedy for one of the CB potential key problems - the restrictive 
effect. This criticism assumed that the only way to increase the currency supply under the CB  arrangement 
was by means of a current account surplus (Fischer (1982)). Yet bank credit was capable of expansion. As 
deposits expanded, the public's currency-deposit ratio fell, as did also bank's excess reserves and their 
reserve-deposit ratio. The money supply could grow even in the absence of current account surpluses. 
Moreover, international capital inflows were also available to increase the currency supply. A secular rise in 
output did not necessarily betoken a falling price level. 
5  Gulde, Kähkonen and Keller (2000) stress that this is essentially the same mechanism that also operates 
under other fixed exchange rate arrangements, but the lesser room for discretionary monetary policy and the 
correspondingly stronger exchange rate guarantee implied by the CBA suggest that the necessary interest rate 
changes and the associated costs for the economy could be comparatively lower.  
 
ICEG EC Working Paper Urmas Sepp - Martti Randveer: The Sustainability… 
 
 
9 
line with this argument, IMF has also concluded that due to the simplicity CBA is particularly 
attractive for post-chaos countries and/or for small countries that have recently attained 
independence and that wish to have their own currency for motives of seignorage as well as 
national identity.  
In addition to the lack of central banking expertise at the time of the monetary reform the 
implementation of an effective discretionary monetary policy under different exchange rate 
arrangements was severely constrained by the lack of statistical data. This problem was 
accentuated by the fact that also during the first years after the monetary reform the quality of 
the available statistical data was low. Therefore the lack (and later the low quality) of 
statistical data hindered the creation of a model for the Estonian economy. Without a model 
describing the monetary transmission, the use of a discretionary monetary policy and the 
targeting of economic policy could not have been feasible. 
It is clear that the creation and evaluation of models requires observations and time. Even if 
we believe that Estonian (and foreign) economists had in mind “the right” model (which 
considering the past is a very strong assumption6), one need to have waited until 1996 to be 
able to estimate the model. It was only then that the minimum length of time series was 
available for estimation. But even if the model had been compiled at that time, the reliability 
of that model would have been low. This stems from the fact that the confidence interval of 
the econometric model that is estimated on that short time series is so wide that the model-
based policy recommendations cannot be reliable. The use of the model in 1997-98 would 
have also been hampered by the impact of the Asian and Russian crisis which caused 
significant structural changes in the economy. Therefore the model should have been re-
estimated to take into account these structural changes. Accordingly, an adequate model could 
have been constructed only in 1999 or 2000 (as was the case).  
To summarise, Keller (2000) has argued that an effective anticyclical monetary policy is 
difficult enough to pursue in developed, large and therefore relatively closed economies. In 
transition countries, with rapid structural transformations, the knowledge of our profession 
regarding the exact transmission channels and relevant time lags is clearly less deep. 
Therefore the balance of risk appears to favour small transition economies with fixed 
exchange rates to maintain their exchange rate policy. 
3.2. Part of Stabilization Package 
The implementation of the CBA was a crucial part of the stabilisation package. An important 
reason for choosing CBA arrangement was the need to gain credibility. In addition to that, the 
implementation of the CBA was to provide a solid nominal anchor for both stabilisation and 
                                                 
6  The main problem in determination of the model is shaping of the long-term component. On the basis of a 
time series consisting of a couple of years it is impossible to do adequately. In that respect, the underlying 
inflation could be characteristic of that – each additional year changed radically the vision of underlying 
inflation (see Sepp-Vesilind-Kaasik (2000)).  
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10 
restructuring. CBA arrangement seemed to be a feasible solution for achieving a stable 
monetary environment and a basis for stable economic relations in a short period of time. 
One of the major goals of the economic stabilisation in 1992 was the need to lower 
inflation. As an important feature of the CBA is its noninflationary nature, the implementation 
of the CBA was considered as a way of bringing down the inflation.7 As a result of the 
monetary reform, money supply became endogenously determined and inflation triggering 
excess money supply disappeared. Inflation rate started to fall: in the first quarter of 1992 the 
monthly CPI was close to 30 %; in December 1992 monthly CPI had decelerated to 3.3%. At 
the beginning of 1993 most of the open sector prices had reached the new equilibrium level. 
The disinflation process was quite smooth and the fluctuations of the monthly indices reflect 
mainly administrative steps, including tax measures (Figure 1).8  
Figure 1   
The dynamics of CPI in 1993-96 
 
The introduction of the CBA helped to increase fiscal commitment. In order to avoid 
jeopardizing the target of lower inflation and keeping the external balance “on track,” special 
fiscal targets were set for every year.9 In the period from mid-1993 to the end of 1994, for 
                                                 
7  The noninflationary nature of the CBA stems from the fact that under this arrangement the money supply is 
restricted. Devaluation is eliminated as a possible source of increasing the nominal money stock.  
Furthermore, money supply is strictly constrained by eliminating one of its sources. Under the classical 
two-tier banking system, the central bank issues money against both foreign and domestic assets. In this case 
it performs issuing functions by increasing its monetary liabilities against lending to government (budget 
financing) or commercial banks (refinancing or lender of last resort). Manipulation of domestic sources of 
reserve money underlies monetary policy and, in a sense, is the raison d'etre for central bank existence. 
However, if manipulation is exercised beyond certain sound limits and under governmental pressure it starts 
to generate inflation. (Avramov (1999)) 
8  for a comprehensive discussion of the inflation in Estonia in the first half of the 90s see Sepp-Viilmann 
(1995) 
9  Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1998) have argued that the fixed exchange rates lead to better fiscal results. This is 
largely determined by the fact that the fiscal policy under these currency regimes is subordinated to 
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example, the Government targeted a financial deficit about 1-2% of GDP. These ceilings 
helped to keep the public debt on a low level: since 1997 the government debt has not 
exceeded the 7% level of GDP. 
The economic policy choices made during the monetary reform attained strong confidence 
in Estonian economy, and creditworthiness of the private sector (incl. the banking sector) 
improved considerably during the first couple of years after the monetary reform. Bearing this 
in mind, financial deficit as a fiscal target was replaced by fiscal (overall) deficit, which de 
facto marks a return to tighter fiscal policies. By setting low ceilings to fiscal deficits, the 
government aimed at dampening domestic demand and keeping the domestic economy from 
overshooting. 
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CBA VS ALTERNATIVE POLICY RULES IN ESTONIA 10 
The purpose of the comparative analysis is to determine the performance11 of CBA in 
comparison with the situation where another monetary system would have been used in 
Estonia. CBA has been compared with the monetary policy rule targeting inflation or/and 
output gap and using the interest rate as the instrument. 
The historical deterministic simulations show that under the simplified assumption of 
perfect information of the monetary authority12 the rules that target only one variable – either 
output gap or inflation - outperformed formally the CBA. Whereas it appears that targeting 
output gap causes the interest rate volatility to increase drastically. This is due to the fact that 
output gap makes up approximately ¾ of the loss function (i.e. total variation of gap, inflation 
and interest rate). The rest of the total variation is divided more or less equally between 
inflation and interest rate.  
                                                                                                                                                        
maintaining the fixed exchange rate. There is a essential difference between the intermediate regimes of a 
fixed exchange rate and the currency board (which is a further manifestation of the advantage of the stringent 
commitment of a currency board). While the first retains the possibility for monetary authorities to hold 
domestic assets, with currency boards this possibility is eliminated. Therefore the possibility that overly 
expansionary fiscal policy will cause a currency crisis under CBA is strongly reduced. 
10 The model that was used for the comparative analysis is described in the Appendix 2. 
11 The performance of monetary rule was expressed in the conventional way - by quadratic loss function 
including output gap, the deviaton of inflation from its long-run value and the difference of interest rate.   
12 In our experiments, the monetary authority is assumed to know the true structure of the economy. The 
monetary authority understands the formation of private agents’ expectations, and is able to use this 
knowledge to its advantage. The possession of perfect information entails two things – firstly, the central 
bank is competent to make 100 per cent adequate decisions. Secondly, the perfect information assumption 
allows to realise its decision precisely in accordance with the expectation and intentions. The reality is 
certainly more complex than the above simplification. Svensson and Woodford state that central bank 
operates under considerable uncertainty due to the circularity problem. Many important indicator variables 
for central banks are forward-looking variables, variables that depend on private-sector expectations of the 
future developments in the economy and future policy. However, these expectations in turn depend on an 
estimate of the current state of the economy, and that estimate in turn depends, to some extent, on 
observations of the current forward-looking variables. (Svensson and Woodford (2000)) 
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Figure 2 and 3 specify a trade-off between gap and interest rate variation. It appears that if 
we use interest rate for smoothening the gap, then the interest rate variation becomes similar 
to gap (actual) hypervariation. The reason for that is straightforward. The CBA simulations 
showed that due the openness of the Estonian economy, the output gap depends mostly on 
foreign demand and the role of domestic demand is marginal. Therefor the smoothing of gap 
(i.e. domestic demand) through interest rate requires irrational growth of interest rate 
variability.      
Figure 2   
Simulated dynamics of interest rate in case of CBA and gap targeting (when the gap has 
weight equal to 1,3 or 5 in the monetary rule) 
 
Figure 3   
Simulated dynamics of gap in case of CBA and gap targeting (when the gap has weight 
equal to 1,3 or 5 in the monetary rule) 
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13 
The historical simulation showed that only the inflation targeting could have been 
hypothetically competetive with CBA – provided that the central bank does not make 
mistakes, etc. 
Anyway there is a way to soften the unrealistic assumption of perfect information and use 
stochastic simulations instead. For the latter, the relations described in model are realised 
stochastically, i.e. in the simulations the decisions of the central bank do not correspond 100 
per cent to perfect information, but contain also mistakes. On the other hand, stochastic 
simulation provides a possibility that the decisions of the CBA will realise in a different way 
than compared with the intention of central bankers. To conclude, stochastic simulation 
provides a relatively realistic framework for comparative analysis of monetary rules. 
Stochastic simulation proves CBA to be the most suitable for Estonian economy. The 
advantage of CBA comes from the lowest variation of the interest rate. In the case of other 
monetary rules, interest rate must vary considerably in order to be able to smooth targeted 
variable. At the same time, however, the growth of interest rate variation does not 
counterbalance the decrease in targeted variability.  
Although the result – the advantage of CBA – could be guessed intuitively, the reasoning is 
not in accordance with the views expressed in economic literature. Characteristic to the fixed 
rate, and accordingly also to CBA, is wider variation of interest rate as compared to other 
exchange rate regimes (i.e. monetary rules). Interest rate variation results from the fact that in 
fixed regime there is no adjustment mechanism that derives from exchage rate changes. 
Adjustment occurs through interest rate changes. In the case of floating rate, however, it is the 
exchange rate that accounts for the adaptation and therefor interest rate variation is marginal. 
5. CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION  
According to Leitemo and Roisland (1999), it is practical to model monetary transmission 
with a two sector model. In the two-sector model, there are basically two explicit channels for 
the transmission of shocks – interest rate and exchange rate channels. It seems plausible that 
the tradables sector output is more sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate, whereas the 
non-tradable sector output is more affected by the real interest rate through domestic demand. 
Below, we will look at both channels, assuming different impacts of interest and exchange 
rates to the sectors. Alas, it is done by one-sector model, because till now we lack two-sector 
model of Estonian economy. As for the interest rate, we use nominal rate, because so far there 
is no empirically confirmed evidence that the real rate has an impact. Leaving aside 
speculative attacks, one might say that it is not a big mistake: in the absence of exchange rate 
risk, the nominal interest rate is a good proxy for investment yield/prices. 
And one more clarification:  although CBA is a fixed rate regime and by the definition the 
dynamics of nominal exchange rate is excluded, we study the effect of the nominal rate. It is 
due to the fact that in some episodes the NEER of kroon depends crucially on 
appreciation/depreciation of the currencies unpegged to DEM or to EURO.  
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One may say that the credit channel has a role to play in Estonian economy, though in 
modelling we were unable to establish that. That both in the loan channel and the balance 
sheet channel. The terms that characterise the latter - adverse selection and moral hazard  - 
were at least in 1997-8 during the turmoil of the Asian and the Russian crises the keywords in 
describing the behaviour of Estonian economic agents.  
5.1. Interest Rate Channel13  
The model includes both the short and the long term rates. The long term interest rate depends 
on short rate and inflation expectations. The system could be reduced to look at only one 
interest rate, but the distinction between short and long rate is useful in order to analyze 
shocks caused by speculative attacks (see section 5). 
The direct effect of the nominal interest rate is characterized by considerable restrictive 
impact. Regarding GDP it is a well documented puzzling negative correlation between real 
output and the short term nominal interest rate (Fuhrer-Moore (1995)). In the case of Estonia, 
a one percentage-point rise in short term rate (Fig 4) impacts domestic demand: SHORT 
LENDING RATE↑ OUTPUT GAP↓. At the same time this transmission includes a kind of 
adjustment mechanism – as the money supply in the model is determined solely by 
transaction motive, and money supply has negative effect on the interest rate, then OUTPUT 
GAP↓ M2↓ LENDING RATE↑.  
In addition to the effect on domestic demand, one can see from the Fig 4 that there exists 
also a marginal supply side effect, which is indicated by  the decline of export. As capital (and 
therefore investments) is explanatory variables of export in the long-run, and investments are 
negatively related to interest rate, then LENDING RATE ↑ CREDIT ↓  
INVESTMENTS↓ REAL CAPITAL ↓  EXPORT ↓ 
EXPORT converges with the pre-shock trajectory as the impact of the error correction 
process becomes prevailing in late stages of adjustment and GDP↑ CREDIT↑   
INVESTMENTS↑ REAL CAPITAL↑  EXPORT↑. 14 
 
                                                 
13 The interest rate channel of our model does not actually include the interest rate arbitrage. The reason comes 
from the fact, that we failed to model international financial flows.  
14 This scheme contrasts the transmission logic of Leitemo and Roisland’s two-sector model. Using their 
argumentation, one could assume that the effect of interest rate is expressed in decline of output in the 
domestic nontradables sector, which assumingly lowers inflation rate. Declining inflation and depreciation of 
domestic currency raises competitiveness and export.  
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Figure 4   
Interest rate shock in %% from the baseline  
 
Due to the output gap, the rise in interest rate has a small impact on inflation as well (Fig 
4,5.). 
Figure 5   
Interest rate shock  absolute deviation  from the baseline  
5.2. Exchange Rate Channel 
The importance of exchange rate channel comes from the openness of Estonian economy. 
This channel transmits impacts of nominal as well as of real exchange rates. According to the 
restrictions of the fixed exchange rate regime, it is understandable that the real rate channel is 
particularly effective. 
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5.2.1. Real Exchange Rate (REER) 
As mentioned above, the real exchange rate operates as a factor of export in the long run. The 
dynamics of real rate in (transition) economy with fixed exchange rate is primarily 
determined by domestic inflation, which depends on the convergence of price level and of 
relative prices. The appreciation of real rate means, ceteris paribus, declining (price) 
competitiviness and slower growth of export. In our simulations the permanent shock in the 
real effective exchange rate (1%point appreciation) has constant effect on real variables. 
Appreciation leads to lower long-term level of growth because of decreased competitiveness 
(Fig 6.). 
Figure 6   
Shock of REER in %% from the baseline   
5.2.2. Nominal Exchange Rate (USD)  
USD and SEK  are on the trade bases principal floating currencies with respect to the 
Estonian kroon. Looking at the Fig 7, one may follow the adjustment after the nominal 
appreciation of USD by 1%. It can be concluded that the effect of the appreciation of dollar 
on real indicators is rather significant, and in total, positive. This is due to favorable reaction 
of real exchange rate.  
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Figure 7   
USD shock in %% from the baseline   
 
The nominal depreciation of kroon affects the economy through several variables. The 
increasing competitiveness raises export and GDP. 
 
Figure 8   
USD shock as absolute deviation  from the baseline  
 
On the other hand, the appreciation of USD causes domestic inflation by the increase of 
import prices (Fig  8). Inflation is supported also by increase of  exports  which  creates some 
extra demand pressure. However, it is evident, that the overall effect of USD appreciation is 
positive. The real depreciation of kroon due to nominal depreciation of it is bigger than the 
real appreciation caused by inflation (Fig 9).  
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Figure 9   
USD shock as absolute deviation  from the baseline  
 
5.3. Significance of Transmission Channels 
Looking at the variation of key variables, it is clear that the interest rate channel is to some 
extent more influential.15 Nominal rise in interest rate by 1% (Fig 10) causes immediate 
decrease of GDP by  -0,2%. The impact of 1% appreciation of NEER remains slightly less 
(0,16% decrease of GDP, see Appendix 2).  Post-shock adjustment - at least considering the 
GDP dynamics - is clearly more volatile in the case of interest rate shock. It is understandable 
– as the exchange rate is fixed, the interest rate is the prime variable carrying the burden of 
short-run adjustment.  
Although the outcome is logical within the framework of the fixed exchange regime 
paradigm, it contrasts slightly intuition based on the realities of the Estonian economy. Taking 
into account the openness,  one could have expected the prevalence of the impact exchange 
rate. Interest rate channel reacts primarily through the demand of nontradable sector, what has 
only a minor contribution to GDP. Therefore the impact of interest rate to the aggregate 
indicators (incl GDP) should be minor as well. On the other hand, the exchange rate is an 
influential argument of  the tradables sector output. As the tradables sector is prevailing in 
Estonia, then, of course, one would conclude that the impact of exchange rate is crucial also 
for the development of  the whole economy. 
                                                 
15  Higher importance of interest rate channel cannot be explained by the differences of the relative sizes of the 
shocks. If one takes into account the real variation of these variables, then the shocks of both indicators are of 
the same proportion. 1 %point makes approximately a quarter in standard deviation of the interest rate (equal 
to 4.7%). 1%change of NEER constitutes the same proportion in its standard deviation (4,6%). 
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6. SUSTAINABILITY OF CBA 
In addition to the legal and institutional factors that are the prerequisites and increase the 
sustainability of a CBA, a range of economic factors have to be in place for a well-
functioning CBA. In other words the sustainability of the currency board also depends on the 
ability of the real economy to function reasonably well under such exchange rate regime.  
One of the features of a CBA is the absence of an independent monetary policy. Therefore 
an economy operating under CBA principles needs greater flexibility of the markets in order 
to cope with missing adjustment instruments of monetary-policy and of the floating exchange 
rate. In fact under currency board economic adjustment has to come through price and wage 
adjustments. Therefore the sufficient flexibility of the labor and good markets are especially 
important.16  
Under a currency board the role of fiscal policy is also of great importance, as it is the main 
policy tool, which can be used for economic stabilization.17 
A sound banking system is an essential condition for the stability of the CBA. This 
necessity arises from several reasons. First (in most cases) monetary authority under CBA 
cannot act as a lender of last resort; secondly as there is no automatic refinancing window at 
the central bank, the principal role in ensuring a stable liquidity system, has to be fulfilled, 
first and foremost by financial intermediaries themselves.18 
                                                 
16 The gain from the CBA derives from the flexibility of the economy. The flexibility, in turn, stems from the 
liberalization and openness. Yet it is a one-sided conclusion since it only reflects the short-term effect. In 
fact, CBA relevantly relates to the long-term aspect as well. The flexibility, liberal organization and openness 
of the Estonian economy are partially also the results of the introduction of the CBA (and the reforms 
initiated thereby). The structure of our economy is endogenous to monetary rule: CBA is most suitable 
because Estonia has developed a favourable environment for CBA through structural and institutional 
reforms. 
17 Avramov (1999) points out that an indirect threat for the system could come from political pressures for a 
withdrawal from the CBA through a change in the fixed exchange rate. The depression of the real sector and 
the restrictive financial conditions will decrease public support for maintaining the CBA.  
18 Viable banking system is also important due to the intertwining of monetary and credit systems which creates 
a connection between exchange-rate crises and bank crises. Stockam stresses that banking-system crises can 
create speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate. Crises in currency markets and credit markets can feed 
on each other. This interrelationship - the fact that we have the same set of institutions for the allocation of 
credit in an economy as we have for promoting transactions services - means that monetary arrangements 
such as an exchange-rate system can affect the real economy through these credit channels.  Importance of 
these credit channels remains controversial. Nevertheless, there is evidence to worry about those issues and 
to believe that they may be worse in countries with less-developed financial systems, business firms may 
depend even more heavily on the banking system (rather than direct acquisition of funds in capital markets) 
than in more developed countries. (Stockman, p.1495-9) 
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6.1. Simulation of External Shocks 
One way to analyse the sustainability of Estonian CBA is to look at the outcomes of the 
shock- simulations. So we studied the following external shocks, most relevant under the 
CBA (not to consider the speculative attacks): 
• nominal exchange rate shock (using the macromodel of the Estonian economy, it is 
possible to simulate the impact change of exchange rate of USD (see section 3.2.2), 
Swedish krona (Appendix 1), Russian ruble and also NEER (appendix 2)); 
• shock of foreign interest rate (EURIBOR_3M, appendix 3); 
• export shock (using the model it is possible to distinguish the impact of different factors of 
external demand  - as of GDP of EU15, the Finnish GDP, the CPI of EU15, the Russian 
CPI, etc  in our exercise the foreign demand shock is studied in the simple aggregate form 
(Appendix 5)); 
• shock in import prices (Appendix 4).  
The main conceptual conclusion to be drawn is that temporary shocks do not cause the 
divergence of the Estonian economy from the long-run path. Or in other words, the 
adjustment of exogenous shocks leads to convergence with the long-run path. According to 
intuition, export shock proved to be the most effective exogenous shock. 
In order to verify that convergence is not caused by the mutual compensation of shocks, the 
least favourable combination of the simultaneous shocks was studied. The most restrictive 
selection of the shocks includes the increase of the interest rate, decrease of demand resulting 
negative GDP gap, fall in money supply etc. Nevertheless, the conclusion made earlier holds 
true here as well – shocks adjustment leads onto the long-run path.  
We studied also the permanent shocks. The conclusions were in accordance with intuition: 
adjustment after demand side shocks leads back to the previous growth trajectory relatively 
quickly. The main exception is adjustment of EXPORT shock. Due to the role of external 
demand for the Estonian economy, the post-shock convergence is rather slow. As the external 
demand is the critical factor of output gap, the positive export shock produces increasing 
inflation, which in turn results in appreciation of real exchange rate and in temporary decline 
of competitiveness. 
The second exception of convergence is the EURIBOR shock which has an essential 
impact on domestic interest rate. Interest rate has a direct effect on supply side through 
investments and on fixed capital (as capital formation is touched). The convergence is very 
slow: at the end of the period under the consideration (2005:04), the GDP deviation was still 
0,0022% and EXPORT deviation 0,0044% from its baseline simulation.  
Anyway, the main conclusion of our simple exercises is that shocks adjust to the long-run 
path and in this aspect the Estonian currency board seems sustainable. 
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6.2. Actual Performance of CBA  
Second way to analyse the sustainability of Estonian CBA is to look how the economy has 
actually coped with shocks. As the Asian and Russian crisis both had a clear impact on the 
Estonian economy, we will analyse how the Estonian economy reacted to the adverse 
conditions brought by these external shocks.  
The two external shocks that hit Estonia in 1997-98 were of different magnitude and 
influenced Estonian economy through different channels. The common feature of the crisis 
was the fact that these shocks spread via contagion effects – both crisis started with a 
speculative attack and were accompanied by difficulties in obtaining foreign financing. 
The influence of the Asian crisis to Estonian economy was less severe. It started with a 
speculative attack and a decrease in foreign capital inflows, which resulted in the significant 
fall of the prices of financial assets and a temporary rise in money market rates.  
The impact of the Russian crisis to the real sector was stronger. As a result, Estonia 
recorded four consecutive quarters of economic decline starting from the 4th quarter of 1998. 
The decline was steepest in the first half of 1999 when the output contracted by 3 % as 
compared to the first half of 1998. Although in the second half of the year another growth 
phase started, the overall GDP growth remained negative for the year 1999 (-1,1 %). The 
decline in economic growth was mainly due to a sharp contraction in exports. For the 1999 as 
a whole merchandise exports declined by 5 % - during the first half of the year the decline in 
exports amounted to 10 %. Obviously the exports to CIS was the hardest hit – during that 
period exports to Russia decreased by 40 %.  
The influence of the Russian crisis was also felt in the financial sector. Immediately after 
the Russian crisis broke out there was a strong speculative attack on Estonian Kroon, 
significant increase in money market rates, subsequently both the growth in the money supply 
and loans stopped. The speculative attack was triggered by the contagion effect of the Russian 
crisis. The strength of these effects were supported by the fact that Estonia had relatively 
strong trade relations with Russia.  In addition to that Estonia was in a vulnerable position 
because of its high current account deficit which at the outbreak of the crisis was seen as a 
threat to the existing exchange rate arrangement.  
In conclusion, the Russian crisis (to a lesser extent also Asian crisis) could be considered a 
good test of the sustainability of the CBA (particularly from the perspective of the viability of 
financial sector).  
The two years starting from the second half of 1997 demonstrated the ability of Estonia’s 
financial system to cope with rapid changes in the environment. The financial sector proved 
its performance efficiency in the face of severe external shocks. It could be said that Estonian 
financial sector emerged stronger from this turmoil – the capitalisation and liquidity of the 
banks increased and the involvement of Nordic banking groups also increased the credibility 
of domestic banks. Therefore one can conclude that the sustainability of the Estonian financial 
sector has increased during the last years which supports the argument that it is strongly 
supporting the sustainability of the CBA itself. 
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7. THE CASE STUDY OF THE SPECULATIVE ATTACK: THE RUSSIAN CRISIS  
7.1. Money Supply  
The Russian crisis also had a strong effect on the money supply. For the first time since the 
beginning of 1993, the money supply (both M2 and M1) contracted in absolute terms in the 
second half of 1998. Broader money supply decreased from 28 billion EEK in the end of July 
1998 to 25,5 billion EEK in the end of January 1999. The decline in broader money supply 
reflected a decrease in cash in circulation and demand and time deposits of Estonian kroon 
(see Figure 10). During the period from July 1998 to January 1999 cash in circulation 
decreased by 12 %, demand deposits of EEK by 13 % and time deposits of EEK by 17 %. The 
only exception was the foreign currency deposits which increased by 10 %.   
Figure 10   
The dynamics of the components of money supply from June 1998 to March 1999 
 
The decline in money supply was due to several reasons. First of all the Asian and Russian 
economic crisis decreased the credibility of emerging economies which in turn triggered a 
decline of foreign capital inflows to those countries (including Estonia). These developments 
were also exacerbated by a slowdown in Estonian economy.  As a result of these 
developments the foreign capital inflows decreased from 11 billion EEK in 1997 to 7 billion 
EEK in 1998. Secondly the Russian crisis also caused a strong slowdown in the growth rate of 
consumers incomes and corporate profits. It is reasonable to assume that private individuals 
used temporarily part of their deposits for consumption smoothing and enterprises used their 
cash balances to cushion the growing problems with external financing.   
Also the Russian crisis roughly coincided with a bankruptcy of a medium-sized bank 
(Maapank) which decreased the credibility of Estonian banking sector. At that time it was 
widely assumed that the Russian crisis will increase strongly the amount of bad loans. 
Therefore the decreased credibility of the banking sector and subsequent problems with 2 
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small banks (ERA Pank, EVEA Pank) in the autumn brought about a withdrawal of deposits 
from Estonian  banks (especially from the smaller banks). 
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the Russian crisis also increased the probability 
of a devaluation. This is evidenced by the fact that during the second half of 1998 Estonian 
private individuals and firms decreased their cash portfolios of Estonian kroons and their 
demand and time deposits in EEK. Against the background of decreasing banking sector 
credibility and economic hardships Estonian private individuals increased their foreign 
currency holdings in Estonian commercial banks. This could be seen as an evidence of fears 
of devaluation among Estonian economic agents. Simple correlation analysis shows that 
during July 1998 and March 1999 the interest rates of forward transactions and components of 
money supply exhibited a strong negative correlation. The correlation between interest rates 
of forward transactions and M1, M2, demand deposits of EEK and time deposits of EEK were 
–0.54, -0.76, -0.51 and –0.35, respectively (see also Figure 11). 
Figure 11   
Interest rates of forward transactions and M1 from June 1998 to March 1999 
 
7.2. Forward Market  
Similarly to the Asian crisis, the first influences of the Russian crisis were felt in the 
financial sector (mainly in the forward market). During the second half-year the foreign 
currency forward market experienced a substantial rise in price quotations, which was related 
to the crisis in Russia. Before the Russian crisis the interest rate of DEM-EEK forward 
transactions ranged from 2 % (1-month forward transactions) to 5 % (1-year forward 
transactions) (see Figure 12). With the start of the Russian crisis the price quotations surged 
and peaked in December when the interest rates of these transactions amounted to nearly 15 
%. The reasons for this currency speculation was mainly based on the belief that Estonian 
economy is not able to withstand the adverse influence of the Russian economic crisis and in 
order to maintain its external competitiveness vis-à-vis Russian enterprises has to devalue its 
currency. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the currency speculation was launched by foreign 
financial intermediaries, both the Estonian commercial banks and to a lesser extent Estonian 
corporate sector firms were betting on the stability of the exchange rate of EEK.   
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Unlike October 1997, the rise in quotations was not followed by a notable increase in 
trading volumes. In the third quarter the volume of DEM-EEK forward transactions 
undertaken by the banks amounted to 7.8 billion kroons which was less than the record-
breaking 9.5 billion kroons in November 1997. The difference between the behaviour of the 
commercial banks in the forward market in the second half of 1997 and second half of 1998 
can be seen in the different dynamics of the price quotations (see Figure 12). While in the 
second half of 1997 the interest rates of forward transactions amounted to 8%, the 
corresponding figure in 1998 was twice as high. At the same time the difference between the 
money market interest rates in the second half of 1997 as compared to the second half of 1998 
was quite small. This, in turn, indicates that Estonian commercial banks were at that time less 
inclined to take risks. On one hand, position taking was restrained by the availability of bank 
funds and the fact that due to the involvement of foreign capital in the banking sector the 
commercial banks took a cautious position which was evidenced by the reduced limits related 
to forward transactions. On the other hand, a huge bid-offer spread in foreign currencies and 
high interest levels made speculations expensive.  
Figure 12   
Interest rates of forward transactions (1-month to 1-year) in June 1997 to March 1999. 
 
Because of the consolidation process in the banking sector and involvement of foreign 
capital, short positions of foreign banks in the Estonian kroons started to decrease on the 
forward market from November and with them also price quotations of Estonian kroon 
forwards. By December 1998, the situation in the forward market stabilised and returned to 
normal level. 
7.3. Interest Rates 
In addition to the impact of the Russian crisis on forward market, the developments in Russia 
also influenced money and credit markets. Due to the increased instability related to the 
Russian crisis, the money market interest surged again in August and this increase stopped 
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only in November. The money market interests rates peaked in November and December, but 
then started to decrease – between December 1998 and April 1999 the money market interest 
rates decreased from ~18 % to 6-7 %. This strong decline was associated with the 
disappearance of the foreign speculative pressure and the involvement of strategic investors 
which increased the capitalisation and liquidity of the banking sector.  
Figure 13   
The growth of money supply and credit in 1997-2000 
 
In the credit markets the influence of the Russian crisis already reinforced the already 
prevailing trend – the decline in credit growth (Figure 13). In the 4th quarter of 1998, the 
credit to residents started to decline (this trend continued up to the 3rd quarter of 1999). The 
decline in commercial banks loan portfolio in 1999 stemmed mainly from the Russian crisis. 
On one hand, the Russian crisis decreased the investment demand of the corporate sector and 
there-by reduced the demand for loans; on the other hand, it caused the commercial banks to 
adopt a more conservative lending policy. 
Model simulations indicate that an increase in forward points, which is caused by currency 
speculation, has a strong impact on Estonian short-term interest rates, its impact on long-term 
interest rates is modest.  
The Russian crisis had also an effect on long-term interest rates (the average long-term 
interest rates increased from 12 % in the 3rd quarter of 1998 to 14 % in the 4th quarter of 
1998). 
Figure 14 shows the effect of an increase in forward points that is equal to an increase in 
forward points in the 3rd quarter of 1998 – during that period the interest rates of forward 
transactions increased ca 6 %. As a result of this, shock short-term interest rates increase 
approximately by 3 percentage points. At the same time the influence of a temporary increase 
in forward points is short-lived. 
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Figure 14   
Effects of a speculative attack (increase in forward points) on interest rates  
 
7.4. Consequences of Crises 
In addition to the effect of currency speculation on interest rates, it also has an impact on the 
price level and real variables (GDP, exports). Model simulations (see Figure 15 and 16) reveal 
that an increase in forward points has a relatively strong impact on Estonian GDP growth. 
Figure 15 shows that a temporary increase in forward points (equal to the increase in forward 
points in the 3rd quarter of 1998) causes a ca 0,6 % decline of GDP growth from baseline. On 
the other hand, the negative impact of this exogenous shock is temporary (1-quarter) and GDP 
growth converges to its long-run path. The impact of an increase in forward points has a small 
impact on exports and price level.  
Figure 15   
Effects of a speculative attack (increase in forward points) on exports, GDP and CPI  
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Effects of a speculative attack (increase in forward points) on import prices,  
GDP gap, CPI and PPI  
 
In addition to the influence of Asian and Russian crisis on monetary aggregates and credit 
and money markets, they also quickened the pace of consolidation in the financial system. As 
under CBA, the burden of adjustment remains with banks, two years of turbulence resulted in 
the second wave of consolidation of the banking system. The number of banks fell from 12 in 
1997 to 6 in 1999. This dramatic fall did not involve either remarkable loss for depositors or 
serious deterioration in asset quality. There were 3 mergers resulting in highly oligopolistic 
banking market – two leading banking groups possess more than 80% of total assets of the 
banking system. Third merger was more of a rescue operation, resulting in central bank 
ownership of the third largest bank (which was later sold to foreign strategic investor). It is 
clear, that turbulence in international markets forced consolidation of the banking sector; also 
in end 1998, Scandinavian banks entered as strategic owners of the two largest banking 
groups. Due to involvement of strategic investors and rapid consolidation, the banking sector 
became highly capitalised and liquid. 
8. FISCAL POLICY STANCE (1997-2000) 
 
Fiscal discipline is an essential prerequisite for the sustainability of the CBA. As was argued 
in the second chapter of this material, the CBA eliminates or strictly limits the monetary 
authorities ability to monetise fiscal deficits. But there is still a possibility that the government 
could run irresponsible fiscal policy. This in turn might undermine the stability of the 
economy and create political pressures for abandoning the CBA, there by increasing the risk 
of a currency crisis. Therefore the fiscal policy should be aimed at achieving a sustainable 
economic growth. This is underlined by the fact that under a CBA the central bank cannot 
implement an effective discretionary monetary policy – the primary policy tool for 
macroeconomic stabilization is fiscal policy. 
Since 1995 the deteriorating current account deficit became the main concern of the fiscal 
policy and the government started to target fiscal deficits (Figure 17). By setting low ceilings 
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to fiscal deficits the government aimed at dampening domestic demand and keeping domestic 
economy form “overshooting”.  The role of fiscal policy became crucial in 1997- mid 1998. 
By spring 1997 current account deficits exceeded 14% of GDP and the domestic credit 
growth was over 70 % (y-o-y). Under these circumstances the government made a decision to 
raise the public savings as much as possible. This brought along a drastic change: in the first 
quarter of 1997 the general government budget was practically balanced, reaching a surplus of 
5% of GDP in the third quarter and more than 2% of GDP in the fourth quarter. The overall 
annual surplus of over 2% of GDP was generated in the second half of the year. During the 
period of surplus-generating fiscal policy the Stabilisation Reserve Fund was established. 
Investing the funds of the Stabilisation Reserve Fund abroad served the aim of reducing 
domestic demand and sustaining foreign investor confidence in economic policy.  
Figure 17   
The dynamics of economic growth and fiscal deficits in 1996-2000 
 
The tight fiscal policy continued in the first half of 1998, helping not only to stop 
deterioration but also decrease current account deficit. With large capital inflows, restrictive 
fiscal policy helped to maintain foreign investor confidence, avoided the overheating of 
economy, as well as the balance of payment crisis and reduced volatility of capital flows. 
Economic decline in the 2nd half of 1998 and 1st half of 1999 had a negative impact on 
fiscal revenues: the general government accounts swung from a surplus of 2.2% of GDP at the 
end of June 1998 to a deficit of 0.2 % of GDP for 1998. The 1999 draft budget was elaborated 
before the full extent of the slowdown and was based on too optimistic growth expectations. 
In addition, the draft was worked out and passed at the Parliament in a pre-election period. As 
a result, deficit increased even further in 1999, reaching over 6% of GDP in the first half. The 
deficit was financed from the reserve built up during the years of fiscal surpluses. 
After the elections, the new government prepared a supplementary budget, which cut 
expenditures by about 1.2% of GDP and was adopted by the Parliament in June 1999. As a 
result the public sector deficit decreased somewhat in the second half of 1999, for the year as 
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a whole the deficit was equal to 4,7 % of GDP. In 2000 the authorities aimed to curb the 
deficit and succeeded to lower it to 0,7 % of GDP. 
Therefore it could be said that during the last 4 years fiscal policy has been used for 
stabilisation purposes – in 1997 and 1998 fiscal policy measures were implemented to avoid 
overheating of the economy, in 1999 it cushioned the decline in economic activity. Taking 
into account that fiscal policy is the main policy tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
fiscal policy this far has supported the sustainability of the CBA. At the same time authorities 
have managed to keep public sector deficits manageable and have swiftly reacted to avoid 
large fiscal deficits. 
9. THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE REAL SECTOR OF THE ESTONIAN ECONOMY 
Given the strict rule based monetary framework, the real sector flexibility (especially labour 
market flexibility) is an important prerequisite for smooth adjustment to both external and 
internal shocks. As Estonia has set few restrictions and regulations to the labour market, this 
has created possibilities to develop a flexible wage and employment system.  
Vesilind and Rell (2000) used the period 1996 – 1999 1st half to estimate the flexibility of 
the wage-setting in the economy. They found that the wages were quite flexible in the 
tradables sector of the economy – the changes in the productivity had a strong impact on the 
wages (Figure 18). In the sheltered sector of the economy the relationship between 
productivity and wages was less evident. In the public sector, however, the changes in the 
economic activity had a negligible effect on the wages of the public sector employees (Figure 
19). 
Figure 18   
The real wage and productivity growth in tradeables sector in 1996-99 
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Figure 19   
The real wage and productivity growth in public sector 1996-99 
 
In addition to analysing directly the flexibility of the labour and goods markets, the 
flexibility of the Estonian economy can be assessed indirectly by looking at the deviations of 
the actual real effective exchange rate (REER) from the equilibrium level. By this way one 
can gain insight about the flexibility of the economy by looking whether the actual REER has 
deviated from the equilibrium level and how quickly has the actual REER returned to its 
equilibrium path. It could be said that the smaller the deviations are and the quicker the return 
of the actual REER to its equilibrium level is, the higher the flexibility of the economy. 
From 1992 the real effective exchange rate of Estonian kroon has continued an appreciating 
trend. In particular in 1997 it showed a 5 % appreciation, a 17 % appreciation in 1998 (mainly 
due to the Russian crisis) and a 4 % depreciation in both 1999 and 2000 (due to low CPI 
growth and the weakening of the euro) (Figure 20). As the Estonian Kroon was clearly 
undervalued in the first years after the monetary reform part of the appreciation is therefore 
just a normal path towards equilibrium, driven by the existing price differential with western 
partners. Calculations done in BoE (Filipozzi (2000)) suggests that in addition to the 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate also its equilibrium level appreciated (Figure 
21).19  But the appreciation of the equilibrium REER has been slower than that of actual 
REER. For example in 1993 the misalignment (the difference between actual and equilibrium 
REER) decreased from ca 25 % in 1993 to 7-8 % right before the Russian crisis.  
 
                                                 
19 In this estimation the equilibrium REER depended on the following variables: productivity differential 
between tradeables and nontradeables sectors, investment share, resource balance and nominal effective 
exchange rate.  
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Figure 20   
The dynamics of REER in 1995-2000 
 
Figure 21   
The difference between REER and equilibrium REER 
 
The Russian crisis brought about a sudden jump in REER – therefore the actual REER 
exceeded the equilibrium REER by appr. 5 %. But today the actual REER has fallen slightly 
below the equilibrium one. 
From this we can conclude that in the period 1997-2000 the REER of EEK was not 
overvalued. This conclusion can be affected by different hypotheses on the equilibrium or 
sustainable value of fundamentals that influence the equilibrium REER but the main message 
of our estimation remains unchanged. The appreciation of real exchange rate goes together 
with an appreciation of its equilibrium value, and this did not damage seriously the external 
competitiveness of Estonian economy and cause a significant widening of current account 
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deficit. The fact that during the last 4 years the equilibrium real exchange rate and actual 
exchange rate have not differed significantly for a longer period indirectly demonstrates the 
flexibility of the economy which in turn increases the sustainability of the CBA.  
The argument that the actual REER has not exceeded the equilibrium exchange rate level or 
put differently the actual REER has not been overvalued, is also evidenced by the trends in 
Estonian foreign trade. In 1998-2000 the annual growth in exports has every year exceeded 
the growth rate in imports – during that period the average annual growth rate of exports was 
23 %, the corresponding figure for imports was 15 % (Figure 22). Therefore it could be 
argued that these foreign trade developments indicate that the continual real appreciation of 
the REER has not negatively affected Estonian competitiveness. 
Figure 22   
The export and import growth in 1994-2000 
 
As it was said, the Russian crisis (in the 3rd quarter of 1998) caused the actual REER to 
appreciate significantly and exceed the equilibrium level. According to the calculations by 
Filipozzi (2000), the actual REER returned to its equilibrium level already in the second 
quarter of 1999. In addition to the flexibility in the labour market, this was supported by the 
rapid reorientation of Estonian trade from CIS markets to Western – Europe. In 1997 the 
share of Estonian goods exports to Russia amounted to 14 %, two years later (in 1999) it had 
decreased to only 5 %. During the same period the share of exports to EU increased from 58 
% in 1997 to 70 % in 1999. In addition to the increase of the share of Estonian exports to 
Western Europe, its growth was also strong (27 % in 1998 and 6 % in 1999). Together with 
the rapid reorientation of Estonian trade, there were also significant changes in the structure of 
the manufacturing and commodity structure of the exports. As a result of the Russian crisis 
the importance of the food–processing industry declined considerably; at the same against the 
background of overall decline there was fast growth in manufacture of machinery and 
equipment.  These trends brought along also changes in the structure of foreign trade – the 
share of foodstuffs in exports decreased from 16 % in the 1st half of 1998 to 6 % in the 1st half 
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33%.  This rapid reorientation of trade and changes in the structure of the economy therefore 
points to the flexibility of the economy.    
10. COMPATIBILITY  OF  THE  ESTONIAN CBA WITH EMU AND ERM 2 
The process of acquiring the full participation in EMU can be divided into three distinct 
stages:  
• Estonia's economic and monetary policy preparations to accede to the European Union 
(from an applicant country to full EU membership)  
• Estonia as a European Union Member State: period from the accession to the European 
Union to joining the euro area;  
• Estonia joins the euro area: Estonia will participate in the formulation and implementation 
of the EU monetary policy (ie the central bank will implement ECB monetary policy 
guidelines and manage the circulation of the cash and account money in euros)  
Estonia’s official position is the maintenance of Estonia’s currency board and fixed 
exchange rate peg until the full participation in EMU, inter alia, during Estonia’s participation 
in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM 2, the standard fluctuation band 0 %).  
The main reasons for maintaining CBA arrangement can be divided into two groups. First, 
Estonian economy has prerequisites for a successful CBA: quite flexible labour and goods 
markets, resilient financial sector and sustainable fiscal policy. Secondly, the Bank of Estonia 
wishes to avoid possible economic costs (increased uncertainty that might lower investments, 
reduced policy transparency and discipline and high exchange rate fluctuations) associated 
with a move from a CBA to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement.  
Currently also the official position of the ECB and (un)official position of the IMF are 
similar to that of the Bank of Estonia – both the ECB and IMF have acknowledged that there 
are no fundamental reasons against maintaining CBA until the full participation in EMU. 
According to the official position of the ECB (2000) euro-based currency board 
arrangements cannot be regarded as an acceptable substitute for participation in ERM II, but 
may in some circumstances constitute an appropriate unilateral commitment undertaking 
enhancing the commitment to exchange rate stability deriving from participation in ERM II. It 
should be emphasised that their unilateral character implies that they would not impose 
additional obligations on the ECB, besides those deriving from the ERM II resolution.  
ECB has noted that there do not seem to be fundamental reasons that would suggest that 
CBAs might be counterproductive in the run up to accession, provided some preconditions are 
met. Notably among these are: sufficient international reserves to back up the CBA, a strong 
commitment to fiscal discipline, a sound financial system with proper regulation and 
supervision, and goods and labour markets with flexible prices and wages. While the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed, other prices adjust to keep the real exchange rate at an appropriate 
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level. CBAs have also reinforced candidate countries prudent attitude towards fiscal policy by 
forbidding the central bank to monetise fiscal deficits. 
ECB has argued that CBAs are a proper policy choice for countries where a fixed exchange 
rate system is deemed appropriate, such as small, open economies with flexible input and 
output markets. The choice of anchor is most important, as the anchor currency must not only 
enjoy the confidence of markets, but also be the currency of an entity which the CBA 
economy has close economic and trade relations. 
At the same time ECB has acknowledged that during the transition and catching-up period, 
there are factors tending to produce an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Among these 
are price liberalisation, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and implementation of community 
acquis having an impact on prices and price convergence to the EU. Under currency boards, 
there is no trade-off between prices and exchange rates, hence a nominal appreciation could 
not counter these factors, and there will be some resulting inflation, higher than EU-average. 
The ECB has concluded that this real appreciation should not necessaritly have a negative 
impact on competitiveness because there are still economy-wide productivity gains to be 
achieved in transition economies, and there is a large scope for improvement in non-price 
competitiveness.  
In addition to ECB IMF (see Keller (2000), Gulde, Kähkonen, Keller (2000)) has also 
endorsed the view that CBA is compatible with EMU an ERM 2 mechanism. Still one has to 
keep in mind this is not an official position of the IMF. 
Keller(2000) has found that ECB decision that a euro-pegged CBA will be permitted under 
ERM2 on a case-by-case basis provided that agreement is reached on the central rate vis-à-vis 
the euro is a most welcome decision as there does not appear to exist a solid economic 
argument against maintaining a well functioning CBA under ERM2. However, Balassa-
Samuelson effects, or other reasons for equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation, may 
make it difficult for a country with a CBA to meet inflation convergence criteria as now 
defined. Rough calculations suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is perhaps equivalent 
to slightly more than the 1½ percentage point inflation margin allowed under the Maastricht 
criteria. However, this would probably be less of a problem for countries using the wide band 
of ERM2 as they could in principle allow their nominal exchange rates to appreciate. In the 
past (and most recently in the case of Greece) the EU has also deemed revaluations of central 
rates within the ERM to be consistent with the convergence process. And as also recently 
demonstrated, strategic tax cuts can help meet the Maastricht inflation target. There remains 
also the question whether it would not be appropriate to redefine the Maastricht criteria, so as 
to take account, inter alia, of the trend of real appreciation in the CEEC transition countries. It 
is clear that their circumstances differ from those countries that became the original euro-area 
members. 
The above-mentioned authors have argued that the success of the Estonian currency board 
arrangement in weathering severe crises—prompted by banking failures (1992–1993), the 
emerging markets crisis (1997), and the Russia crisis (1998)—has reinforced the authorities’ 
commitment to maintain the existing arrangement through EU accession and ERM2. This 
should not be problematic for Estonia. First, the CBA enjoys considerable credibility, which 
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should reduce convergence play. While in the most recent crises (1997 and 1998), short-term 
domestic interest rates rose rapidly from about 5–6 percent to over 15 percent, they unwound 
relatively quickly and are currently at historically low and close to euro area levels. Second, 
under the discipline of the CBA, the authorities have transformed their economy: in 
particular, the banking system has been consolidated, supervision strengthened and labor 
markets are quite flexible. Third, a very low level of public sector debt provides room for 
fiscal policy flexibility.  
Keller (2000) has also concluded that the economic justification for allowing a CBA in 
ERM2 appears strong. With unfettered capital flows, the appropriateness of the exchange rate 
parity can be inferred indirectly by the size of interest differentials and the durability of export 
and GDP growth. And provided that prices and wages are sufficiently flexible, real exchange 
rate flexibility can still be achieved under a CBA. Moreover, moving from a CBA to a more 
flexible exchange regime is unlikely to provide a clear indication about the long-term 
equilibrium exchange rate—if we look, for example, at the exchange rates between the euro 
and the U.S. dollar—and could entail significant economic costs. During an intermediate 
period with a more flexible exchange rate regime, the exchange rate could be expected to 
fluctuate significantly as market participants speculate about the rate for euro-zone entry. In 
addition, abandoning a well-functioning and credible currency board could lead to reduced 
policy transparency and discipline, lower investment as a result of greater uncertainty, and the 
potential for households to shy away from local currency savings. Very importantly, there 
may be no obvious candidate for an alternative monetary policy framework since, following 
an extended period with a CBA, it might be difficult to identify a stable quantitative 
framework linking policy instruments to inflation, while the range of available central bank 
instruments might also be inadequate.  
11. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF JOINING EMU 
According to the official position of Estonia, we are prepared to adopt and implement the 
acquis with respect to economic and monetary union in full on accession to the European 
Union. Estonia does not request any transitional period to the acquis in this chapter.  
At the present moment Estonian legislation is not fully in compliance with the EU acquis of 
the EMU; however, the basics are in place: capital movements are largely liberalized; the 
central bank is independent from the Government; and Estonian fiscal policy aims at budget 
balance. The remaining harmonization of the respective legislation will be achieved by 2003, 
i.e. by the time we expect to join the EU (two key acts in this field are the Basic Budget Act 
and the Central Bank Act). This enables Estonia to participate in the EU as a non-euro area 
country. BoES accept the position of the EU that the EU and the euro area cannot be joined 
simultaneously, while Estonia will be granted the status of a member state with derogation 
upon accession to the EMU. 
Estonia remains committed to align its policies with the EMU acquis and guarantees their 
effective implementation in accordance with the final objective of adopting the euro. 
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In addition to the harmonisation of the Estonian legislation there are also some institutional 
aspects that deserve attention in light of the accession and joining EMU. Namely there is a 
need for the reform of the monetary policy operational framework.  
The ongoing reform of monetary operational framework is targeted to improvement of 
standing facilities which form the core of any CBA. In the medium term the joining of Euro 
area is expected in line with EU enlargement. This gives rise to a specific question – how 
should a CBA be merged into single currency area in operational terms? Which different 
scenarios can be under consideration? By and large, there seem to be at least two alternative 
ways to treat this issue:  
• quick operational convergence with limited use of open market operations (as a CBA itself 
limits the scope for OMOs);  
• stepwise operational convergence which means improvement of standing facilities and 
creation of conditions for full-scale operational framework with delayed implementation 
until joining the EMU.  
As it is internationally recognized by today, a CBA can be regarded a suitable exchange 
rate arrangement for nominal and real convergence towards single currency area – i.e. Euro 
area – in case of Estonia. Therefore the second option (i.e stepwise operational convergence) 
has been chosen for the reform of the operational framework. 
The ongoing reform of Estonian monetary policy operational framework has the following 
goals:  
The first goal is the reorganisation of the required reserves' system. This means lowering 
the rate of required reserves with the central bank (in national currency) with simultaneous 
rise of required reserves in high-rated liquid foreign assets (in anchor currency). This reminds 
to some extent the liquidity requirement operational in Argentina. Here it is important to note 
that the ratio of the required reserve with the central banks was 13 % in 2000, that is 
significantly higher than in the eurozone (2 %). 
The second major goal is the start of operational convergence towards EMU. One of the 
central issues here is the introduction of high-rated liquid foreign assets (in anchor currency) 
which will serve as a collateral for intra-day liquidity facility which is necessary for starting 
the RTGS. This can also mean the possibility for creating marginal lending facility, 
collateralized by foreign assets. In the longer run, extending the maturity of intra-day repo 
facility can be the way to converge to ECB type facilities (2 week repo, etc.). If the foreign 
assets in question are high-rated (no less AA for example) and euro denominated, this can be 
the way for operational convergence towards the Eurozone standards in the medium term 
without undermining the credibility of the CBA in the short-term.  
The final goal is the maintenance of the credibility of the CBA in terms of financial 
independence. In terms of central bank expenditures this reform will not change much. As 
required reserves are remunerated in Estonia, the financial outcome of the reform depends on 
difference of earnings rate on central bank's foreign assets (currency board cover) and 
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required reserves remuneration rate. This feature also limits the possibilities of the central 
bank to offer market rate remuneration on required reserves, as the central bank must cover its 
risks as well.  
12.  ECONOMIC PROBLEMS RELATED TO EMU: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
ACHIEVING FULL NOMINAL AND REAL CONVERGENCE 
It is widely accepted that the income and price level of a given country are positively related. 
As it was also briefly mentioned ECB (2000) has acknowledged this tendency and has argued 
that real appreciation (which under fixed exchange rate regimes reveals via inflation 
differential, say between Estonia and EU) should not necessarily have a negative impact on 
competitiveness. 
Although there is consensus in theoretical literature of the positive correlation between 
income and price level, it is quite difficult to quantify this. According to a recent IMF (2000) 
study that looked at the relationship between income and price level convergence in Central 
European (CE) countries, a 1 percentage point growth differential between EU and CE will 
lead to 0.4 % price level increase in these accession countries. Kravis (1986) and Hansson and 
Helliwell (1990) have found that a 1 % increase in income level will cause a 0.6-0.9 and 0.4 
% increase in price level, respectively.  
A European Comparison Program (1996) has produced analogous results. It shows that 
there is relatively strong correlation between price and income convergence in countries with 
income levels below 60-70 % of the Austrian level, i.e in the group of countries Estonia 
belongs to. On the other hand, countries with income levels above 80 % of Austrian income 
do not have considerable positive correlation. Based on that one can conclude that the 
relationship between price and income convergence is stronger when the income level of a 
country is relatively low. 
Simple calculations done in the Bank of Estonia show that a 1 % increase in income level 
of transition countries will lead to a 0.5-0.7 % increase in the price level of these countries. 
Assuming that the long-run (10-20 years) economic growth rate of Estonia is 5 % and that of 
the EU is 2 %, the inflation differential between Estonia and EU would be approximately 2 
percentage points. Naturally the inflation rate of a transition economy is strongly influenced 
by other factors specific to transition economies (price liberalisation, the influence of 
adopting community acquis on prices) as well as usual supply- and demand-side factors. For 
example the recession Estonia endured in 1999 caused the price differential between Estonia 
and EU to narrow to less than 1 percentage points. On the other hand, the strong rebound in 
2000 and 2001 with the impact of the weakening of the euro will probably result in a 
widening of this inflation differential (to about 3 percentage points in 2001). 
The relationship between price and income convergence indicates that in the next 10-20 
years the inflation differential between Estonia and EU will remain probably higher than 
stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore it could be said that achieving full nominal (if it 
is interpreted as a strict fulfilment of Maastricht criteria) convergence might under specific 
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circumstances hinder the pace of real convergence. Hopefully it will be acknowledged that the 
inflation differential between an accession country with a fixed exchange rate regime and EU 
might not show the worsening competitiveness of the accession country. But the situation is 
just opposite – the higher inflation in accession country might be a response to increasing 
competitiveness in the latter. 
ICEG EC Working Paper Urmas Sepp - Martti Randveer: The Sustainability… 
 
 
39 
R E F E R E N C E S  
Avramov, R. (1999). The Role of a Currency Board in Financial Crises: The Case of Bulgaria, 
Discussion Papers 6/1999 Bulgarian National Bank 
Baltic (2000) -Saving, Investment, and External Adjustment in the Face of Exogenous 
Shocks. IMF, Preliminary Draft   
Dobrinsky, R. (2000) Fiscal Policy Under a Currency Board Arrangement: Bulgaria’s Post-
crisis Policy Dilemmas. WIIW, Research Report No. 265 
Fischer, S.  (1982). Relative Price Variability and Inflation in the United States and Germany, 
European Economic Review. Vol. 18, June. 
Frenkel, M.- Nickel, C.- Schmidt, G. (1999) Some Shocking Aspects of EMU Enlargement. 
Deutsche Bank, Research Note RN-99-4 
Fuhrer, J.- Moore, G.R. (1995) Monetary Policy Trade-offs and the Correlation between 
Nominal Interest Rates and Real Output. The American Economic Review 1995:3  
Gulde, A.-M. (1999). The Role of the Currency Board in Bulgaria`s Stabilization, Finance and 
Development. September 1999, Vol. 36, No 3 
Gulde- Kähkonen - Keller (2000). Pros and Cons of Currency Board Arrangements in the 
Lead-up to EU Accession and Participation in the Euro Zone.  IMF Policy Discussion 
Paper/00/1. 
IMF (1996). Currency Board Arrangements - Issues, Experiences, and Implications for Fund-
Supported Programs, IMF SM/96/302 
Kwan Y.K.- Lui F.T. (1999) Hong Kong´s currency board and changing monetary Regimes 
NBER WP No. 5723 
Leitemo, K.- Roisland, O. (1999) Effects on the Traded and Non-Traded Sectors . University 
of Oslo. Memorandum No. 04/99 
Osband, K. - D. Villaneuva. (1992). Independent Currency Authorities: An Analytical Primer, 
IMF WP/92/50 
Saavalainen, T. (1995). Stabilization in the Baltic Countries: A Comparative Analysis, Paper 
for the 1995 Annual Meetings of the Allied Social Science Associations, Washington. 
Stockman, A.C. (1999). Choosing an exchange-rate system, Journal of Banking and Finance 
23. pp. 1483-1498  
Tsang, Shu-ki (1998). Two Essays  on Hong-Kong’s Currency Board System, BRC Papers on 
China CP98009 
Walters, A.  - S. Hanke. (1992). Currency Boards. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of  Money 
and Finance, London. The MacMillian Press. 
ICEG EC Working Paper Urmas Sepp - Martti Randveer: The Sustainability… 
 
 
40 
APPENDIX 1.  
Measures taken by Eesti Pank (EP) aimed to improve the monetary policy operational 
framework in changing internal and external environment 
Measure Date Underlying causes Impact on markets 
Standing facility of buying/selling foreign currency to commercial banks ("forex window")  
Abolishing the 
spread in 
EEK/DEM (since 
1.01.99. EEK/EUR 
and other EMU 
currencies) 
transactions 
between EP and 
domestic credit 
institutions 
1.07. 96 • Promote the effective functioning of the forex 
market and facilitating short-term interest 
arbitrage  
• Bigger banks have established an effective 
infrastructure for such "broader liquidity 
management" as well as strengthened their 
foreign liquidity buffers  
• Transactions between EP and commercial 
banks have simplified  
• Role of the domestic inter-bank forex 
market has gradually weakened  
• Lowered interest rate margin between the 
Estonian kroon and the euro due to missing 
capital controls  
• For liquidity management purposes the 
"forex window" could not be viewed as an 
alternative to required reserves in very 
short term (T+0)  
Reserve requirement  
Introducing the 
monthly averaging 
principle in meeting 
the reserve 
requirement 
1.07.96 • Provide for banks more flexible buffer for the 
short-term liquidity management in order to 
limit liquidity risks and stabilise the inter-bank 
money market interest rates  
• The use of daily minimum requirement by 
banks decreased substantially  
• Assessment of the impact of introducing 
the averaging on the interest rate stability is 
complicated because of significant 
structural changes in the banking sector 
over the past 3 years. However, the interest 
rate level has been stable in normal times  
Lowering of the 
cash deductibility 
in meeting the 
reserve requirement 
1.07.96 
(40%) 
1.07.97 
(30%) 
19.06.98 
(20%) 
• Decrease actual cash demand  
• Increase liquidity buffers  
• Decrease of security risks of cash holdings  
• In 1996-1997 banks have taken into 
account cash deductibility ratio in their 
cash holdings  
• In 1998 the impact of the decrease of cash 
component was insignificant  
Adding net 
liabilities of credit 
institutions vis-à-
vis foreign banks to 
the reserve 
requirement 
calculation base 
1.07.97 • Diminish structural deviations caused by the 
massive foreign capital inflow  
• Eliminate "unjustified advantages" of credit 
supply based on foreign capital inflow  
• Limit credit expansion  
• Increase liquidity buffers  
• Strong signal to banks about the risks of 
foreign liabilities based credit expansion  
• Banks’ circumventing the requirement in 
various ways (over reporting cycle, over 
channelling capital inflow via other parts of 
banking group)  
• The size of foreign reserves of banks grew; 
at the same time the quality of foreign 
assets remained ambiguous  
Increase in the 
penalty interest rate 
for non-compliance 
with the reserve 
requirement to 20% 
1.11.97 • Ensure the meeting of the reserve requirement 
in a situation where the market interest rates 
tend to grow higher than penalty interest rate 
set by EP  
• Created the "ceiling" for the money market 
interest rates  
• The penalty interest rate has been too high 
and rigid at normal times  
Raising the daily 
minimum reserve 
requirement to 4% 
of the reserve base 
1.11.97 • Force the banks to keep intra-day kroon 
liquidity reserves due to instability stemming 
from Asian crisis  
• Provide EP with some flexibility in the case of 
potential liquidity crisis  
• Because of the relatively high (monthly 
averaged) reserve requirement the daily 
requirement did not play any important 
role, particularly for bigger banks  
Extending the 
reserve requirement 
base: including 
financial guarantees 
into reserve base 
1.08.98 • Avoid circumventing of "net liabilities against 
foreign banks" clause in reserve requirements 
over channelling the capital inflow via other 
parts of financial groups  
• For strengthening the liquidity buffers of the 
monetary system  
• The volume of effective reserve 
requirement increased significantly  
• Rapid adjustment of banks: the amount of 
banks’ guarantees to financial institutions 
and non-resident credit institutions 
diminished  
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Remuneration of 
required reserves 
1.07.99 • Decrease distortions on financial market by 
reducing negative impact of the 
uncompensated reserve requirement  
• Decrease advantages of other financial market 
players (not subject to reserve requirement) 
over credit institutions  
• Avoid reducing liquidity buffers, while 
reforming operational framework in a more 
market-oriented direction  
• Decrease in the structural deviations  
• Signalling effect: continuation of restrictive 
monetary policy in the conditions of 
expansive fiscal policy  
• Partial compensation for the restrictive 
monetary policy  
additional liquidity requirement (ALR)  
Establishing 
liquidity 
requirement 
1.11.97 • Prevent banks from expanding their loan 
portfolios at the expense of liquidity buffers in 
the deteriorating financial environment  
• Enhance financial stability  
• Restrict credit expansion  
• Considerable growth of banks’ deposits 
held with EP  
• Most banks did not face any trouble 
meeting the requirement after the 
introducing it  
• Strong positive signal in the middle of 
Asian financial crisis  
Maintaining the 
liquidity 
requirement 
1998 • Maintain adequate liquidity buffers and secure 
financial stability (precautionary measures in 
order to avoid the contagious effects of the 
Russian financial crisis)  
 
 1999 • Continue restrictive monetary policy in the 
conditions of the expansive fiscal policy  
• Maintain adequate liquidity buffers for 
potential Y2K problems  
 
Penalty for non-
compliance with 
additional liquidity 
requirement 
1.11.97 • Ensure the meeting of ALR  • Overwhelmingly correct meeting of ALR  
• Case by case penalty rule may cause moral 
hazard  
• Liquidity buffer at EP is in practice not 
operational (due to harsh penalty 
measures), thereby hindering smooth 
liquidity management  
standing deposit facility  
Establishing 
standing deposit 
facility 
1.07.96 Increase banks’ incentives to maintain liquidity in 
domestic currency 
• Assessment of the impact on reserve 
demand ambiguous  
• The instrument has supported smooth 
functioning of the liquidity management  
certificates of deposits of Eesti Pank  
Central bank CD 
auctions 
19.03.93 • Increase the efficiency of inter-bank money 
market  
• Smooth seasonal fluctuations in the cash 
demand cycles  
• The creation of an instrument based on 
domestic eligible security was meant to 
encourage domestic inter-bank market (via 
providing potential collateral)  
• Does not function at turbulent times (if 
market rates are significantly higher than 
the yield offered by the central bank)  
• Is a divergence form orthodox currency 
board as it changes money supply; hence 
the volumes have been kept very small and 
yield capped; hence its role diminished in 
line with deepening of financial 
intermediation  
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APPENDIX 2.  
Nominal appreciation of  Swedish Krona 
 
in %% from the baseline : RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
 
in %% from the baseline : RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is  output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator 
 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: REER_BQ is base index of real effective exchange 
rate of Estonian kroon, NEER _BQ is base index of nominal effective exchange rate of 
Estonian kroon. 
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APPENDIX 3. 
Appreciation of  NEER  
 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: REER_BQ is base index of real effective exchange 
rate of Estonian kroon, NEER _BQ is base index of nominal effective exchange rate of 
Estonian kroon. 
 
in %% from the baseline : RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is  output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI  
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APPENDIX 4.   
1% point increase of EURIBOR 
Temporary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as absolute deviation from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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Permanent (+1%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI  
 
 
Permanent  (+2%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI  
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APPENDIX 5.  
1%point increase of import prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is  output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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APPENDIX 6. 
Increase of exports (+1,5%) 
Temporary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is  output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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Permanent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in %% from the baseline: RX_C is export in real terms, SKP is GDP in real terms, 
IL_AV_LYH is short lending rate, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as absolute deviation  from the baseline: DEF_M_4Q is annualized import deflator, 
DER_LRSKP is  output gap, TOHI_4Q is annualized PPI, THI_4Q is annualized CPI 
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